Ethereum privacy wallet Fluidkey announced on November 22 that it was hacked on November 19After-action report: The attackers transferred approximately $1.6 million from 52 accounts in 37 minutes. The private key never left the user's phone, but the money was still transferred. The reason is that the hacker read the user's login credentials in the internal log, prepared the transfer on the server in advance, and waited for the user to open the app to be signed out.
Chain News November 20When reporting the incident, Fluidkey has not yet announced the cause and loss. When forwarding the report, Yu Xian, the founder of Slow Mist, said: "This case is considered a classic and worth knowing."
The entrance is a logging tool that has not been updated.
According to reports, attackers exploited two vulnerabilities in SigNoz to gain entry. SigNoz is an open source logging tool installed by Fluidkey on its own server. Fluidkey is running version v0.121.1. These two vulnerabilities have been patched in v0.141.1 and v0.142.1 respectively. The attackers had been probing since November 5th and read internal logs between November 12th and 19th.
The problem is that some Fluidkey services write the user's login credentials (session token) into the log. Login credentials are what the server uses to identify "this is the logged in user." There are also some viewing keys for newly registered accounts in the log.
The private key has not been leaked and the app is automatically signed when unlocked.
Fluidkey's private key is stored on the user's mobile phone and will not be transmitted to the server, so just by setting up the transfer on the server, the money will not move by itself. What the attacker does is:
- Use the stolen credentials to create a transfer request on the Fluidkey server and mark it as "Approved"
- Use the same set of credentials to increase the spending limit for two-step verification
- Make a small amount of money to the victim account, triggering a credit notification
- After the user sees the notification and opens the App and unlocks it, the App checks out the pre-prepared transfer as a transaction approved by the user.
Fluidkey's timeline shows that the first unauthorized transfer occurred at 17:28 UTC. 15 minutes later, customer service received a report from the first user. At 18:05, transaction processing was completely stopped, and then the warning of "suspended use of the website and app" was issued.
887 ETH entered the coin mixer, and personal information of 70 accounts was leaked
The stolen assets are distributed in Ethereum, Base, BNB Chain, Polygon, Optimism and Arbitrum. Fluidkey and Security Alliance SEAL 911 tracked and found that most of the funds were converted into ETH and transferred to Ethereum, of which approximately 887 ETH was deposited into the currency mixing service on the evening of the 19th. Fluidkey has entrusted the blockchain investigation company zeroShadow to trace the case and notified the US FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) and the Swiss National Cyber Security Center.
The log leak also affected personal information, involving 70 accounts: 38 emails, 37 names, 17 bank account numbers (IBANs), 24 addresses, 4 birthdays and 2 phone numbers. The viewing keys of another 54 new accounts were taken away. The addresses, balances and transaction records can be seen, but funds cannot be transferred.
After correction: There is no user key and the server does not accept the transfer request.
Fluidkey resumed service with version 1.79.22 at 15:27 UTC on the 20th. All login statuses were logged out. SigNoz has updated and changed credentials. The query interface is no longer open to the public, and login credentials and sensitive information are no longer written in the logs.
The most critical change is: the server now only accepts transfer requests authorized by the user's own key. Login credentials alone can no longer create and approve transfers; adjustments to the two-factor verification limit are also verified by the server. Fluidkey said it is checking what is stored in all self-operated and third-party tools, who can access it, and how to update it.
Fluidkey focuses on stealth addresses, which generate different addresses for each payment. Chain News has previouslyIntroduced its usage. This incident shows that "having the private key in your own hands" does not mean security: as long as the app signs the transactions prepared by the server, server-side vulnerabilities can still transfer the user's money.
this article The reason why Fluidkey was hacked: The log leaked the login credentials, and the user automatically signed the app when he opened it first appeared in Chain News ABMedia。




