Why did the VC that created China’s Internet Golden Age disappear?
Anti-cold wax
2026.11.20 12:32
· From Zhejiang
Full text 5346 words
Text | Wax for cold protection
If you paid attention to the Internet more than ten years ago, you are likely to have an impression of this kind of news: a certain startup company completed tens of millions of dollars in Series A financing; a certain platform received investment from Sequoia Capital, IDG and other institutions; a certain company was established only a few years ago and its valuation has exceeded US$1 billion.
At that time, financing was almost a landmark event for Internet entrepreneurship in China, and it was also the way ordinary people understood entrepreneurship.
When we open the technology media today, we will find that this type of news has not completely disappeared, but the entrepreneurial narrative composed of Internet entrepreneurs, US dollar funds, and rounds of financing has clearly receded. The primary market is still lively, but the protagonists are replaced by AI, semiconductors, robotics and advanced manufacturing.
What’s even more interesting is that the money hasn’t gotten any less. Data from Zero2IPO Research Center show that in 2025, 5,039 new funds were raised in China's equity investment market, raising 1,648.304 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 14.1%; in the first three quarters of 2026, new funds were raised 1,673.933 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 47.3%. The funds are still there and even growing again. So why is the VC era we are familiar with disappearing?
A direct answer is: the people who provide money have changed, and the way venture capital is played has also changed.
How did wealth be created in the golden age of US dollar VC?
To understand today's changes, we must first go back to the starting point of China's Internet. In the late 1990s, there were very few Internet users in China, and e-commerce, search, social networking, and online travel were all just getting started.
But across the ocean, in the United States, Yahoo, Amazon, eBay, and Google have emerged, and many business problems already have answers. Chinese entrepreneurs are not facing a complete unknown, but a future that has been previewed by the United States.
Looking back, the investment logic of that generation of US dollar VCs was also based on this premise. They are looking for teams that can implement mature business models into the Chinese market. The biggest advantage of this kind of investment is that you can use what has happened overseas to verify whether a demand really exists.
The closed loop of making money in this model is also very clear: foreign institutions raise US dollar funds and invest in Chinese Internet startups. Some companies set up red-chip or VIE structures and rely on user growth and continuous financing to expand their scale. Finally, they are listed or acquired overseas, and the fund sells its equity and exits. What the fund earns is the increase in equity value brought about by the growth of the company, and does not rely on interest or dividends.
How amazing can this added value be? Around 1999, IDG invested approximately US$300,000 in eBay and obtained 8.35% of the equity. eBay completed the acquisition in 2003, and IDG received a return of approximately US$6 million, approximately 19.4 times the initial investment. Also in 1999, IDG and Hong Kong PCCW invested approximately US$1.1 million in Tencent respectively, each obtaining approximately 20% of the equity. According to early reports, IDG's overall return was estimated to be approximately 30 times. SoftBank invested approximately US$20 million in Alibaba in 2000. When Alibaba was listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 2014, this investment resulted in huge equity appreciation.
Underpinning these returns is the expansion of China's Internet itself: in 1999, there were approximately 8.9 million Internet users in China; by 2014, this number reached approximately 649 million.
Of course, we also know that not every venture capital project makes money. Suppose a fund invests in 20 companies, 15 of which fail, and 4 of which only have small returns. As long as one of the remaining companies brings dozens of times the return, the entire fund may still make a profit. IDG's earliest fund in China was operated in 1993 and liquidated in 2003. The publicly disclosed internal rate of return was about 36%.
That generation of VC invested in a China that was rapidly becoming Internet-based. But if the rapid growth of the Internet ends and the channels for overseas listings also change, can this money-making model continue to operate?
Why is the money-making machine of US dollar VC gradually failing?
What U.S. dollar VC is gradually losing is the special closed loop between the rapid growth of China’s Internet and the exit of overseas companies at high valuations. This pattern was slowly worn away by three changes, without a single turning point.
The first change is that the market has shifted from land reclamation to stock competition. In the past, startups could expand rapidly by leveraging the growth of Internet users and online consumption; later, leading companies emerged in various fields such as e-commerce, social networking, search, and local life. Startups no longer just look for untapped markets, but also compete for users from giants. The task of investors has also changed from looking for opportunities such as the Chinese version of Amazon to looking for new competitive advantages in mature markets.
The second change is that the certainty of overseas listing has changed. In June 2021, Didi was listed on the New York Stock Exchange; in June 2022, Didi ended trading on the New York Stock Exchange and moved to the over-the-counter market. The stock price fell by more than 80% from the reference price on the first day of listing. The exit channel that has been used repeatedly is no longer an assumption that can be established by default.
Equally symbolic is the announcement of Sequoia Capital's spin-off in June 2023. The businesses in China, Europe, America, India and Southeast Asia will be independent, and Sequoia China will switch to operating under the HongShan brand.
The third change is the connection between technology and capital between China and the United States. The United States will issue an administrative order on foreign investment in 2023, which will be officially implemented in January 2025, banning or reporting requirements on investments in specific semiconductors, quantum technology and artificial intelligence. For a fund with an investment horizon that may be as long as ten years, these uncertainties will be factored into today's decisions.
We can confirm the contraction of the old model by looking at the data. An article by the Development Research Center of the State Council quoted Dealogic statistics: Foreign investment in China's venture capital industry will drop to US$3.7 billion in 2023, a year-on-year decrease of about 60%, and only about 10% of the high in 2021. According to data from Zero2IPO, new foreign currency funds raised approximately 35.8 billion yuan in 2025, a year-on-year decrease of approximately 36%.
US dollar capital has not completely left, but its position in China's primary market is completely different from the past.
And the story is only half told here. Another venture capital system has been developed in China for many years.
The money didn’t disappear, it just changed a group of investors
Let’s look at two sets of data first.
In 2025, the scale of newly raised RMB funds in China's equity investment market will reach 1,612.496 billion yuan, accounting for 97.8% of the total fundraising scale. In the same year, the investment amount of state-owned investment institutions exceeded 570 billion yuan, accounting for 61.5% of the total market investment. In the past, the stars of the VC industry were US dollar funds, but now RMB funds and state-backed capital have occupied a major position.
State-owned venture capital was not born just in the past few years. Shenzhen Venture Capital was established in 1999; around 2002, local government guidance funds began to explore; in 2014, the first phase of the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund was established, with actual fundraising of approximately 138.7 billion yuan; the registered capital of the second phase in 2019 was approximately 204.15 billion yuan; and the registered capital of the third phase in 2024 was 344 billion yuan. From traditional venture capital to guidance funds to large funds targeting key industries, state-owned assets have gradually established their own investment system.
We can use local industrial funds to illustrate how this system works: fiscal funds and local state-owned assets platforms invest as LPs, set up parent funds or industrial funds, and managers invest in enterprises in key industries, and then exit through listing, equity transfer, mergers and acquisitions, buybacks, etc. On the surface, this looks similar to a USD fund. The difference is hidden in the investment objectives: investors of U.S. dollar funds mainly require financial returns; investors of state-owned funds also pay attention to local industrial development, technological capability improvement and industrial chain coordination.
The Weilai case in April 2020 can make this logic concrete. Strategic investors such as Hefei Construction Investment, SDIC Investment, and Anhui High-tech Investment reached an agreement with NIO to invest a total of 7 billion yuan in NIO China, acquiring approximately 24.1% of the equity. NIO China's headquarters was also located in Hefei, and R&D, supply chain, manufacturing and other businesses subsequently entered the city.
For purely financial investors, the most important question is whether the company can grow and whether the equity can appreciate in value. For Hefei, the answer also includes the layout of the new energy vehicle industry chain, the gathering of R&D teams and the entire industrial ecology.
Hefei Construction Investment's credit information shows that the company achieved investment income of 5.862 billion yuan in 2021, which was mainly related to the exit of the NIO project; due to the lack of similar exits in 2022, investment income dropped to approximately 161 million yuan. This set of figures shows that local industrial investment can indeed create considerable equity returns, but financial returns and industrial development results are two things that need to be measured separately.
Investors have different goals and naturally have different criteria for selecting projects. Assume there are two companies: Company A develops new Internet consumer products, which may achieve high commercial returns in the future, but has no clear industrial implementation needs; Company B develops core components of industrial robots, which has a long R&D cycle and uncertain returns, but it can drive local technology and industrial chains. Traditional pure financial VCs are most likely to be more willing to invest in A; while a local fund oriented towards the robotics industry may be more inclined to invest in B even if it recognizes the prospects of A.
Both use the same money, but are looking for different successes. In the past, a company only needed to convince VCs that it had the opportunity to create huge business value; now, some companies also need to prove what they can bring to a certain industry or place. This brings up a contradiction that is more worthy of discussion.
When venture capital begins to pursue certainty
Venture capital was originally a business that allowed failure, relying on high returns from a few successful projects to cover the losses of most projects. But when industry goals, performance appraisals and exit pressures enter investment decisions at the same time, some capital will increasingly prefer projects that can be explained, assessed, and exited. This is the result of the superposition of three mechanisms.
The first mechanism is that investment changes from looking for business opportunities to selecting projects within the industry. USD VC can decide whether to invest based on business model and market space; industrial funds usually have clear directions, such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, robots, and new energy. As a result, whether a company can make a lot of money and whether it can get money from a certain industrial fund have become two different questions.
The changes in the rules of Shenzhen Angel Fund of Funds can illustrate this point from the opposite side. The relevant measures in 2020 set a 1.75 times return investment requirement, and sub-funds need to complete a corresponding proportion of local investment in Shenzhen; the new version of the rules in 2026 cancels this mandatory return investment, converting some industrial goals into post-included rewards and income sharing. The cancellation itself shows that such restrictions will really affect which companies the fund can choose. Commercial VCs are mainly concerned about how valuable the company will be in the future, while industrial funds also ask what the company can create for a certain industry.
The second mechanism is the change in failure tolerance. The income of traditional VC depends on the investment portfolio: if you invest in 20 companies, even 19 of them don't make much money, and the last one creates a 50-fold return, and the entire fund is still profitable. But state-owned funds also have to deal with investment procedures, performance evaluation and asset preservation. When a single project loses money, it may bring more assessment pressure, and investors will naturally pay more attention to existing orders, commercialization progress and corporate maturity. The more venture capital wants to avoid losses, the more likely it is to invest money in companies that have proven they can survive.
This tendency has long been reflected in industry data. An article by the Development Research Center of the State Council quoted Dealroom statistics: from 2014 to 2023, the financing amount obtained by China's start-up companies accounted for approximately 12.6%, and the world's approximately 19.8%; the financing amount obtained by mature companies accounted for approximately 62.7%, and the world's approximately 46.1%. Funding bias toward mature projects is a long-standing feature, and the new funding structure is reinforcing it.
The third mechanism is the most controversial: equity investments begin to behave more and more like debt.
The logic of traditional equity investment is very simple: investors exchange funds for equity. If the company succeeds, they share in the added value; if the company fails, they bear losses. This is what differentiates VCs from banks. But investments with rigid repurchase arrangements change this allocation. Suppose an institution invests 10 million yuan and agrees that if the company does not go public within five years, the founder will repurchase the shares based on the principal plus fixed income. Investors not only want to share in the growth of the company, but also try to obtain downside protection through buyback clauses; once the project fails, the entrepreneur may still be burdened with large repayment obligations. Venture capital originally helped entrepreneurs take risks that banks were unwilling to take, but under certain contractual arrangements, investors tried to return the risks to entrepreneurs.
This is not a theoretical deduction. According to The Paper, from May 2023 to July 2024, Shenzhen Venture Capital launched 34 new legal service procurement tenders for equity repurchase-related lawsuits. Some projects triggered repurchases due to reasons such as not being listed on time and performance bets not being realized. The 2024 annual report of Han Kun Law Firm shows that among the delivery projects it statistics, 83.94% have agreed on repurchase rights. Another industry study sampled hundreds of buyback disputes and found that the proportion of founders listed as defendants reached 90.33%, but the actual recovery rate of funds after entering judicial enforcement procedures was very low.
Buy-back contracts do not really eliminate risks: when a business fails and investors require buy-back, it is often the time when entrepreneurs are most short of money. In December 2025, the China Fund Management Association issued a risk warning specifically on the repurchase terms, proposing to guard against clear shares and real debt.
Let’s look at the three mechanisms together: the industry scope determines which companies can be included in the list, the assessment mechanism affects how much risk the fund is willing to take, and the repurchase arrangement affects how losses are shared. Together, they determine what kind of enterprise capital ultimately flows to. So, how do we get funding for entrepreneurial projects whose success path cannot be predicted at all?
Who will invest in a future that has no name yet?
To answer this question, we must first make the premise clear: the stage of China's economy has changed. In the past, growth opportunities mainly came from the popularization of the Internet and the rapid expansion of market scale; now, China has formed a huge Internet platform and manufacturing system, and capital has begun to pay more attention to technological breakthroughs and long-term R&D capabilities. The two generations of VC serve originally different economic tasks. Things can be seen more clearly by dividing innovation into two categories.
The first category can be called Known Unknowns: you know what problem you want to solve, but you don’t know how to solve it. For example, for advanced chips, core components of industrial robots, and high-performance materials, the needs and technical goals are relatively clear, but the difficulties lie in the research and development path and industrialization. This type of field is suitable for pooling resources and long-term investment, and state-owned industry funds have important value here.
The second category is Unknown Unknowns: even the future market and demand have not yet been defined. Before the emergence of the mobile Internet, it was difficult for anyone to accurately predict the commercial scale of live e-commerce, short videos and mobile payments. This type of innovation requires capital to be willing to believe in an opportunity that has not yet been proven by the market.
There is another layer of contrast here. In the past, US dollar VCs invested in China's Internet. Many times they were looking for commercial needs that had been proven to exist in the United States, and the uncertainty they bore was actually limited; today's industrial funds support hard technology, but they are faced with real technological uncertainty. The ability to innovate does not depend on the nationality of capital, nor can it be simply determined by ownership. It depends on how much uncertainty the set of investment rules can accommodate.
The good news is that state-owned assets are also relearning how to take risks. The National Venture Capital Guidance Fund, launched in December 2025, has a 20-year duration, including a 10-year investment period and a 10-year exit period. It emphasizes early investment, small investment, long-term investment, and investment in hard technology, and requires investment in seed-stage and start-up stage companies to account for no less than 70%. When capital wants to invest in longer-term innovation, it needs to redesign its risk-taking mechanism.
The Chinese economy needs someone to solve the industrial problems that have been seen, and it also needs someone to invest in business opportunities that have not yet been seen. One of the most important values of venture capital is to provide the first money for the future when it has not yet been proven.
Ending|What exactly disappeared?
Back to the beginning, the financing news we are familiar with.
In the past, we saw the rapid growth of China's Internet in the news of Series A and B rounds of financing; today, more capital has entered long-term industrial fields such as semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, and artificial intelligence. The direction of capital flow has changed because the stage of economic development has changed, and it does not matter whether it is good or bad.
But venture capital always answers the same question: Who wants to believe in a business first when it has yet to succeed or even prove its future?
An economy needs both capital investment for the visible future and people willing to take risks for the unseen future.
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